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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO,

:

CaseNo.20010268-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) this Court has jurisdiction in
criminal cases where defendant has been convicted of a first degree felony offense and
the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. In the
underlying proceedings, Appellant/Defendant Jesus Isreal Rosillo was convicted of
aggravated robbery, afirstdegree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1999). The judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. The Utah Supreme Court
transferred the matter to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue on appeal is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury at the conclusion of trial on the lesser-included offense of robbery.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews a trial court's refusal to give a jury
instruction for correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992); see also State v. Kruger. 2000 UT 60, fl 1, 6

P.3d 1116 (citing Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238). Also, in considering whether defendant
was entitled to have the jury instructed on a lesser-included offense, this Court will view
the evidence and inferences that can be drawn from the evidence "in the light most
favorable to the defense." State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983); Kruger, 2000
UT60,1J14.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue was preserved in the record on appeal ("R.") at 78 and 145:53-54.
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999).
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
On August 23, 2000, the statefiledan Information against Rosillo, charging him
with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense. (R. 4-6.) After a preliminary
hearing (see R. 143 (dated September 19, 2000)), Rosillo was bound over for trial on the
charge. On November 28, 2000, the trial court commenced a three-day jury trial in the
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case (R. 83-90; 144-146), and on November 30, 2000, the jury returned a verdict of guilty
on the charged offense. (R. 146:3-5; 87-88; 116.) On January 12, 2001, the trial court
entered judgment against Rosillo and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of
six years to life. (R. 119-20.) Rosillo is appealing from the entry of judgment. (See R.
124-25.) He is incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state presented evidence at trial as follows. On August 18, 2000, at
approximately 2:00 in the morning, Steven Lund, a shuttle van driver for the Embassy
Suites Hotel, was vacuuming out the van at the Ute Car Wash on the corner of 300 South
and 300 East in Salt Lake City. (R. 144:12-14.) While Lund was halfway inside the van,
two men approached him from behind. (R. 144:15.) Lund emerged from the van, turned
around, and observed the men standing next to each other, about five feet from him. (R.
144:15-16.) One of the men, who was later identified as Andrew Mallory (R. 144:51),
was pointing a gun at Lund, "waist level." (R. 144:16.)
Lund testified that the second man, identified as Rosillo (R. 144:16-17), said to
him, "Give me your money." (R. 144:17.) Lund reached into his back pocket, pulled out
a wad of cash, and handed the money to Rosillo. (R. 144:17) Rosillo put the money "in
his pocket." (R. 144:17.) According to Lund, Rosillo spoke to Lund a second time and
told Lund to "give him the rest, or give him the wallet." (R. 144:18.) Lund again
reached into his back pocket. He pulled out his wallet and handed it to Rosillo. (R.
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144:18.) Lund testified that Rosillo took the wallet, opened it up and looked inside it.
(Id.) During the encounter, Mallory did not say anything (R. 144:17, 19). In addition,
Rosillo and Mallory did not say anything to each other. (R. 144:19.) Thereafter, Rosillo
and Mallory turned around and walked away. (R. 144:19.)
Lund testified that he continued to vacuum the van (R. 144:20), then he drove back
to the hotel. En route, he called a person at the hotel by two-way radio and asked her to
call police to report the robbery. (R. 144:21.) When Lund arrived at the hotel, he
described what happened and he gave a description of the suspects to police. (Id.)
According to the evidence, the Ute Car Wash was located approximately a block
from the police station in downtown Salt Lake. (R. 144:61.) The evidence showed that
the suspects lived in an apartment building somewhere between the car wash and the
police station. Shortly after the robbery, the suspects were seen at the apartment complex
getting into a taxi cab. (See R. 144:62; 144:45-46; 144:72,) A police dispatcher provided
information about the taxi cab to responding officers.
Within 10 or 15 minutes of the initial dispatch on the robbery, Officer Carter
observed the taxi cab in the area of State Street and North Temple. Carter and a second
police unit, Officer Hamideh, initiated a felony traffic stop and when the cab pulled over
and stopped, the officers ordered the passengers out of the cab. (R. 144:47; 144:62-64.)
According to Carter and Hamideh, the passengers matched the descriptions of the robbery
suspects. (R. 144:48; 144:64.) The officers frisked the suspects for weapons and

4

obtained consent to search their pockets, discovering approximately $150-$ 169 on each
person. (R. 144:49-50; 144:66-68.) Officers also recovered from Mallory a driver's
license, credit cards and personal items belonging to Lund. (R. 144:51; 144:66-67.)
Thereafter, Officer Daniel Delha took Lund to West Temple to identify the
suspects. (R. 144:21-22; 144:73.) Lund identified Rosillo as the suspect who spoke to
him, and Mallory as the suspect with the gun. (R. 144:22-23; 144:73-74.) Lund also
recognized the driver's license and other items recovered from Mallory's possession as
his. (R. 144:25.)
Meanwhile, Officer Zane Swim went to the apartment complex where the suspects
were seen getting into a cab, and he and two other officers contacted a resident in apartment 22. (R. 144:77-78.) The resident identified herself asRosillo's wife. (R. 144:7879.) Swim explained that Rosillo had been picked up for possible involvement in a
robbery and he requested permission to search the apartment. (R. 144:79.) Mrs. Rosillo
provided consent, and Swim testified that he found a gun with a wallet sitting on top of it
in a closet. (R. 144:79-80.) Lund identified the wallet as his. (R. 144:25.)
After the state presented its evidence in the case, Rosillo testified. He stated that
he had moved into the apartment complex on 200 South and 300 East days before the
robbery in August 2000 (R. 145:6) and that he offered to let Mallory and his family live
there until they couldfindtheir own place to live. (R. 145:8.) On August 18, 2000,
Rosillo and Mallory were on their way to a 7-Eleven convenience store in the neighbor-
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hood to get something to eat. (R. 145:10.) They were talking about the rent for the
apartment, and Mallory promised that he would give money for rent to Rosillo. (Id, at 11.)
As the men were walking by the car wash, Mallory said, "Let's rob somebody."
He then pulled something out of his pants and began to approach Lund. (R. 145:11.)
Rosillo testified that as Lund turned around, Rosillo saw that Mallory had a gun. (R.
145:12.) According to Rosillo, Mallory said to Lund, "[G]ive me your money," and Lund
began searching his pockets. (R. 145:14; 145:29.) Lund then pulled out a wad of cash
and his wallet and handed them to Rosillo. (R. 145:14.)
Rosillo took the items from Lund because he felt he did not have a choice. (R.
145:15.) He was afraid that Mallory may shoot somebody if Rosillo did not accept the
money from Lund, and Rosillo wanted to keep things calm. (R. 145:15; 145:19; 145:31.)
Thereafter, Rosillo turned around and walked away as quickly as he could toward his
apartment building. Mallory caught up to Rosillo and requested the wallet and money.
(R. 145:15.) Rosillo gave the items to him. (R. 145:15.)
When Rosillo and Mallory reached the apartment, Rosillo told Mallory that he
could not stay with Rosillofs family; Mallory and his family would have to leave. (R.
145:16.) Mallory left the room to talk to his wife, and shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mallory
came out and handed $150 to Rosillo for rent. Mrs. Mallory asked to stay at the
apartment, and Rosillo told them both they had to leave by morning. (R. 145:16.)
Rosillo then tried to call his uncle, who lived on 700 North Redwood Road. (R.
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145:16-17.) He wanted to tell his uncle what happened, and to ask his uncle to stay with
his family at the apartment to help him keep Mallory out. (R. 145:16-17.) When Rosillo
could not reach his uncle by phone, he called for a taxi to go to his uncle's house. (R.
145:17.) The taxi arrived and both Rosillo and Mallory got into it. Rosillo decided that
he would drop Mallory off somewhere along the way to get him out of the apartment. (R.
145:18-19; 145:37.)
The taxi cab was en route to the uncle's house when officers initiated the felony
traffic stop. Rosillo testified that he got out of the car at the officers' request and told
them what happened. (R. 145:18; see also 145:44-45.)
The defense requested an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery.
(R. 78; 145:53.) The trial court denied the request. (R. 145:53-54.) After the jury was
instructed on the matter, the jury began deliberations on November 29, 2000, at 1:20 p.m.
(R. 145:85.) On November 30, 2000, the jury reached a verdict of guilty as charged. (R.
146:4-5.) Additional facts relating to this appeal are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
During trial, Rosillo requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the lesserincluded offense of robbery. The trial court denied the request. The trial court's ruling was
in error since the elements of aggravated robbery and robbery overlap. That is, both
aggravated robbery and robbery require proof that defendant, as a party to the offense,
unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession
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of another from his person or immediate presence, against his will and by means of force
or fear. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 and -302. For aggravated robbery, the state was
required to establish an additional element as it related to the defendant: that "he use[d] or
threaten[ed] to use a dangerous weapon" in the commission of the robbery, i d at -302.
In this case, Rosillo provided evidence at trial to support that he was not an
accomplice to the aggravated robbery; he did not "use[] or threaten[] to use a dangerous
weapon." In addition, Utah law does not make Rosillo automatically liable for the
criminal intent and conduct of Mallory in using a weapon during the commission of the
offense. The evidence and the law in this case supported an acquittal on the greater
offense and a conviction on the lesser-included offense. Rosillo was entitled to have his
theory of the case presented to the jury in the form of the lesser-included-offense
instruction. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1986).
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ROBBERY,
Utah appellate courts have ruled that when a defendant requests a jury instruction
on a lesser-included offense, the trial court must provide the instruction if "(i) the
statutory elements of greater and lesser included offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii)
the evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.1" Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (quoting
State v.Baker. 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983V): see State v. Evans. 2001 UT22,^fl8,20
8

P.3d 888; State v. Jones. 878 P.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Code Ann.
§76-l-402(3)(a)(1999).
That two-part analysis constitutes the "evidence-based" standard for determining
whether a trial court must instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense. Baker, 671 P.2d at
158; Jones. 878 P.2d at 1177; Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^[12 (when a lesser included
instruction is requested by defendant, the trial court must apply an "evidence-based"
standard to decide whether the instruction is appropriate) (citing State v. Piansiaksone,
954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998)).
A. THE FIRST PART OF THE BAKER ANALYSIS IS ESTABLISHED: THE
STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND ROBBERY
OVERLAP.
In considering whether the elements of the greater and lesser offenses overlap, this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have specified that the analysis begins with the proof
of facts to be established for each offense. Baker. 671 P.2d at 158; see also CricL 675
P.2d at 529; Jones, 878 P.2d at 1177; Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a). That is, if the
instruction sought by the defendant is for an offense that " i s established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the [greater,
charged offense],' then the offense [in the requested instruction] is a lesser included
offense." Jones. 878 P.2d at 1177 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a); State v.

Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986)).1
In considering the matter in this case, the state charged Rosillo with aggravated
robbery under an accomplice liability theory. (R. 4-6.) To establish that offense, the state
was required to prove the elements for accomplice liability: that "[e]very person, acting
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); (see also R. 105 (jury
instructed on accomplice liability theory); 103 (jury instructed that it must not be
concerned with co-defendant Mallory in assessing Rosillo's liability).)
In addition, under the aggravated robbery statute, the state was required to
establish that as a party to the offense, defendant "in the course of committing robbery . . .
use[d] or threatenjed] to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(a) (1999); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(recognizing that to establish aggravated robbery as an accomplice, state must establish
elements set forth at aggravated robbery statute, § 76-6-302(1), and accomplice liability
1 Section 76-1-402 provides in relevant part the following:
(3)... An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged;
*

*

*

(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
10

statute, § 76-2-202); State v. Labrumu 959 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (under
accomplice liability statute for attempted homicide, where a party did not actually engage
in shooting, the state was required to show that the party both had the required mental
state for the charged offense, and he directly committed the shooting, or solicited,
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the shooting),
cert, denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); (R. 104 (instructions to the jury defined aggravated
robbery as a party to the offense); 108 (elements instruction for aggravated robbery).) A
complete set of the instructions provided to the jury in this case is attached hereto as
Addendum C.
At trial, Rosillo requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the lesserincluded offense of robbery and provide the jury with that alternative as a basis for
conviction. (R. 78 and 145:53-54.) Under the robbery statute, the state would be required
to show that as a party to the offense, defendant "unlawfully and intentionally [took] or
attempted] to take personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear." Utah Code Ann. §
76-301(l)(a) (1999); (R. 78). A copy of the instruction proposed by Rosillo concerning
the lesser-included offense of robbery is attached hereto as Addendum D.
Under Utah statutory law and case law, aggravated robbery and robbery are related
where statutory elements overlap and they require proof of some of the same facts at trial.
See State v. Jensen. 818 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that the offenses of
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aggravated robbery and robbery are obviously related where the only difference between
the offenses is defendant's use of a weapon under the aggravated robbery statute); State v.
HilL 674 P.2d 96, 96-98 (Utah 1983) (recognizing that theft is a lesser-included offense
of aggravated robbery); State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1990) (recognizing
that "possession of a stolen vehicle is a lesser included offense of theft of a vehicle");
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (an offense is included when it is established by proof
of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the charged
offense); compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (aggravated robbery occurs when a person
has committed robbery and has used or threatened the use of a weapon) with Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-301.
In this case, it is obvious that the statutory elements for robbery are included in the
offense for aggravated robbery, placing the offenses in a lesser-included and greater offense relationship. Both crimes required proof that defendant, as a party to the offense,
unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession
of another from his person or immediate presence, against his will and by means of force
or fear. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 and -302. For aggravated robbery, the state was
required to establish an additional element as it related to the defendant: that "he use[d] or
threatened] to use a dangerous weapon" in the commission of the robbery. Id. at -302.
Where the elements for aggravated robbery and robbery overlap, Rosillo has
established thefirstprong of the Baker analysis.

12

B. THE SECOND PART OF THE BAKER ANALYSIS IS ESTABLISHED:
THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED A RATIONAL BASIS FOR THE JURY TO
ACQUIT ROSILLO OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND TO CONVICT HIM
OF ROBBERY, THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE.
Under the second prong of the "evidence-based" test, Utah appellate courts
consider whether there is any rational basis in the evidence to allow the jury to acquit
defendant of the greater charged offense and to convict him of the lesser offense. See
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785,790 (Utah 1984). Under this part of the test, this Court
will not employ a sufficiency analysis to determine whether the state presented evidence
to support the elements of the greater offense. In addition, this Court will not "weigh the
credibility of the evidence, a Junction reserved for the trier of fact." Baker, 671 P.2d at
159. Rather, this Court simply must decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of
evidence presented to justify sending the lesser-included offense instruction to the jury, "a
decision which must be made concerning all jury instructions in any trial." id.
When the elements of two offenses overlap as discussed in the previous paragraph,
if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a
lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense.
Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative
interpretations, and one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense
and conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must give a lesser
included offense instruction at the request of the defendant. This situation will
often arise when the critical question is either the credibility of certain evidence or
the determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of the
evidence. By assessing the evidence and deciding whether any interpretation of it
would, if believed by the jury, permit conviction of the lesser offense and acquittal
of the greater, the court preserves the weighing of evidence for the jury but is still
able to protect the weighing process from frivolous "red herrings."
Baker. 671 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added); see also Jones, 878 P.2d at 1177.
13

This Court will liberally construe the evidence presented at trial to determine
whether there is any rational basis to support the defendant's case and the presentation of
the lesser-included-offense instruction.
The requirements of Baker for the inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction
requested by the defendant should be liberally construed. "Society has a legitimate
interest in the jury's freedom to act according to the evidence." People v.
Chamblis, 395 Mich. 408, 426, 236 N.W.2d 473, 482 (1975), quoted in People v.
Geiger, 35 Cal.3d 510, 523, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 52, 674 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1984).
Where the defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included or a related
offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence on which the jury
could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given. State v. Crick,
675 P.2d 527, 538 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The rule of Baker is not a
mere technical rule designed to trip up judges and prosecutors. It serves a
fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense
that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor
chooses to file and an acquittal. As we recognized in Baker, f,[w]here one of the
elements of the offense charged remains in doubt but the defendant is plainly
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction." 671 P.2d at 157, quoting Keeble v. United States, All U.S. 205,
212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1994, 36 LJEd.2d 844 (1973) (emphasis in original).
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424; Jones, 878 P.2d at 1177 (court must view facts in light most
favorable to defendant).
In considering the evidence in this matter, the jury was instructed on the elements
of aggravated robbery and party liability. The only difference between the charged
offense as instructed (Le. aggravated robbery) and the lesser offense of robbery was the
aggravating circumstance. According to Utah law, before the jury could convict Rosillo
of aggravated robbery as a party to the offense, it was required tofindbeyond a
reasonable doubt that "he use[d] or threaten[ed] to use a dangerous weapon." Utah Code
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Ann. §76-6-302(1 )(a).
Under the accomplice liability provisions, that could be established with evidence
that Rosillo directly committed an aggravated robbery, or he solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided Mallory in his conduct, which constituted
the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. See Webb. 790 P.2d at 84 (to establish
aggravated robbery as an accomplice, state must prove elements set forth at aggravated
robbery statute and accomplice liability statute); Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123 (where a party
did not actually engage in the shooting, the state was required to show that the party had
requisite mental state for the charged offense, and that he directly committed the shooting,
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the
shooting).
While the evidence in this case may have been sufficient to support a conviction
for the greater offense of aggravated robbery, that is not the test for determining whether
a quantum of evidence existed to support providing the jury with an instruction on the
lesser-included offense of robbery. Indeed, as a matter of law and fact, the evidence here
was susceptible of differing interpretations, one of which would support an acquittal on
the aggravated robbery charge and a conviction on the lesser-included offense of robbery,
as set forth below.
1. As a Matter of Law, Even if the Jury Believed that an Aggravated Robbery
Occurred, It Could Still Find that Rosillo Was Criminally Responsible Only for
Robbery.
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Under the law, it is possible to be a party to the greater offense, but to have the
mental state and criminal responsibility only for the commission of the lesser offense.
That is, Lund's testimony - that Rosillo twice requested money from Lund - is susceptible to alternative, reasonable interpretations: On the one hand, the evidence may support
that Rosillo intentionally aided in Mallory's conduct (§ 76-2-202) in the use of a dangerous weapon for accomplice liability under the aggravated robbery statute; on the other
hand, the evidence may support that Rosillo was not responsible for Mallory's conduct,
but was otherwise guilty of a crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (to be liable for conduct
of another, evidence must show defendant directly committed offense, or requested, commanded, solicited, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to engage in conduct).
Under the latter interpretation, if the jury determined that Rosillo was not
responsible for Mallory's conduct in using a gun, he would not be guilty of the
aggravated robbery. He would be acquitted of that offense. Nevertheless, he may be
criminally responsible for robbery as a result of his participation in the matter.
By way of explanation, Utah law recognizes that both Rosillo and Mallory can be
involved in the same criminal conduct, e.g. aggravated robbery, but have different mental
states, making one person criminally responsible for the greater offense and the other
person responsible for the lesser offense:
Party liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in
the criminal conduct have the same mental state. We wrote in State v. Crick, 675
P.2d 527 (Utah 1983):
A defendant can be criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but the
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degree of his responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts that
subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state of the actor. This is
clear from the language of § 76-2-202.
Id. at 534. Thus, three persons can be parties to the same criminal conduct and
each have a different mental state.
State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994) (emphasis in original) (recognizing
accomplices may have different criminal intent in the commission of an offense; some
parties may intend assault while other parties intend io kill victims).
In this matter, while the jury could find that Rosillo committed robbery, it was not
required under the law to attribute Mallory's conduct in using a gun to Rosillo. Here, the
jury should have been allowed to consider (1) whether Rosillo was guilty of aggravated
robbery under an accomplice liability theory, (2) whether an aggravated robbery occurred
but Rosillo was criminally responsible only for robbery, and (3) whether Rosillo had no
intent with respect to the criminal conduct and was therefore innocent. See Alvarez, 872
P.2d at 461-62; see also Crick, 675 P.2d at 534.
While the jury here did not choose the third alternative, we do not know from the
record in this case whether the jury was forced to settle on the first alternative because it
did not have a choice, or if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Rosillo was an
accomplice to Mallory's conduct in using the dangerous weapon. "[W]hen the evidence
is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative
would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury question
exists and the court must give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of
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defendant." Baker. 671 P.2d at 159.
Inasmuch as the law does not require the finder of fact to attribute the conduct and
actions of Mallory to Rosillo, as a matter of law, the evidence here presented alternative
interpretations, thereby creating a jury question as to "what inferences may legitimately
be made." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. Under accomplice liability law, the jury would have a
basis for acquitting Rosillo of aggravated robbery and convicting him of robbery.
Since the evidence was "susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
alternative would permit acquittal" of aggravated robbery as it related to Rosillo and a
conviction for robbery, the trial judge erred in failing to provide an instruction on the
lesser included offense in this matter. The jury should have been permitted to determine
defendant's guilt with the appropriate choices under the law.
2. The Evidence Presented at Trial Supported That Rosillo Was Not an
Accomplice to Mallory's Conduct Thereby Providing a Basis for Acquittal on the
Aggravated Robbery Charge.
In this case, Rosillo presented evidence to support the determination that he did not
share in Mallory's conduct in committing the aggravated robbery; he was not an
accomplice to that offense. Rosillo testified that he and Mallory left for the 7-Eleven
convenience store to get something to eat in the early-morning hours. (R. 145:10.) As
they began to walk toward the car wash, Mallory said, "Let's rob somebody," and he
pulled something from his pants and approached Lund. (R. 145:11.) Rosillo realized
Mallory had a gun when Lund turned around. (R. 145:12; 145:27.) Rosillo did not want
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the matter to get out of hand and he did not want anyone to get hurt, so he did not do
anything to defuse or exacerbate the situation. (R. 145:28; 145:31.)
Rosillo testified that after Lund turned around, Mallory ordered Lund to hand over
the money and wallet. (R. 145:29.) Lund handed those items to Rosillo, and Rosillo took
them because he did not know what to do. Rosillo wanted to keep the situation calm. (R.
145:14-15; see ajso R- 145:44 (Officer Carter did not recall that Rosillo admitted to
taking the wallet).) Rosillo testified that he did not say anything during the encounter,
and that Lund was mistaken when he identified Rosillo as the person who demanded the
money. (R. 145:30; 145:44 (Officer Carter testified that after Rosillo was arrested, he
informed officers he did not participate in the robbery).)
After Rosillo and Mallory left the car wash, Mallory told Rosillo to give him the
money. Rosillo complied. (R. 145:15.) When they arrived at the apartment, Rosillo told
Mallory he would have to leave. Mallory went to a backroom to talk with his wife, and
shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mallory emerged and gave $150 to Rosillo for rent. (R. 145:16.)
The evidence presented by Rosillo supports an acquittal on the greater offense
since Rosillo participated only out of fear and did not engage as a party in the use of the
dangerous weapon. The evidence also supports a conviction on the lesser offense based
on Rosillo's testimony that he participated in the matter, in that he unlawfully took the
money from Lund. The unlawful taking was accomplished by "means" of "fear" (Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301) where Lund was confronted by two men at 2:00 in the morning on
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a dark, empty street. Those facts support a conviction against Rosillo on the lesser
offense of robbery.
Lund's testimony provides further support for the lesser-included offense
instruction. Lund stated that he may have been confused about the situation. Lund
testified that during the entire encounter, the vacuum at the car wash continued to run
beside him. (R. 144:32.) When he tried to recall within a short time of the incident (R.
144:36) what was said that morning, he could not recall the exact words (R. 144:32-33;
144:35-36), and he initially recalled that the suspects demanded money from him only
once. (R. 144:35-36.) Also, Lund was initially confused as to whether Mallory or Rosillo
demanded the money. (R. 144:38-39.) Lund ultimately settled on Rosillo as the person
who made the demand. Lund also testified that he was not positive about the details. (R.
144:40.) When Lund saw Rosillo and Mallory in police custody shortly after the robbery,
he thought they looked alike. (R. 144:40.) Lund's testimony supports that he initially
may have been confused about the matter.
The evidence supports alternative interpretations. While Rosillo was involved in
the robbery, he did not use a weapon, he did not aid Mallory in his use of the weapon, and
he did not solicit, request, command or encourage the use of the weapon. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-202 (party liability). While Rosillo may have been aware of Mallory's use of
a weapon, Rosillo's association with Mallory is not sufficient to attribute Mallory's conduct to Rosillo. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980) (mere presence during
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or prior knowledge of criminal activity does not make person an accomplice of another's
acts, unless that person advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in the conduct); (see also
R. 103; 108 (while jury was advised it must not be concerned with Mallory, the jury was
given only one choice with respect to conviction, and that was to find Rosillo guilty of
Mallory's conduct).) The facts support alternative interpretations that the jury should
have been allowed to consider with the appropriate choices and instructions.
This case is similar to State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421. There, defendant Hansen
and co-defendant Rocco went to David Stewart's house, hog-tied him, and stole several
items of personal property. The house was then set on fire. Id. at 422. Stewart died from
the burns and carbon monoxide poisoning. Id
The defendants drove to a second person's house, tied him up, stole his property
and set his house on fire. The second victim escaped. Jd. Defendant Hansen ultimately
was charged with capital homicide for the death of Stewart. Id
At trial, the state presented evidence to support that defendant committed robbery,
burglary, and arson, and that he intentionally/knowingly killed Stewart during the arson.
See id. at 422-23.
In his defense, defendant Hansen testified that he held a gun on Stewart and tied
him up, and he stole property from Stewart. He also testified that while he was searching
the house for property, he became aware that Rocco had set it on fire. Hansen panicked
and fled the house without helping Stewart. In addition, Hansen denied that he was an
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accomplice to the arson and he denied that he shared Rocco's intent or knowledge that
Stewart would be killed as a result of the fire. Id, at 422-23. "His theory was that his
intentional conduct only involved tying up Stewart during the course of the
burglary/robbery and that the failure to untie Stewart, although the cause of Stewart's
death, was a result of panic after discovery of the fire rather than an intent to kill
Stewart." Id at 423.
At the conclusion of trial, the defense proposed an instruction on the lesserincluded offense of felony murder. Id. at 423. The instruction was consistent with
"Hansen's theory that he did not knowingly or intentionally kill Stewart, but was guilty
only of an unintentional killing that occurred during the course of a robbery or burglary."
Id. The trial court rejected the defendant's instruction but did provide two other lesserincluded-offense instructions, "one that did cover felony-murder, but was premised on an
unintentional killing occurring during the course of an aggravated arson, and another on
manslaughter, premised on an unintentional killing occurring as a result of a recklessly set
fire." I d The jury instructions also described the criteria for holding a person
responsible as an accomplice for crimes committed by the principal. I d
After deliberations, the jury convicted Hansen of capital murder. He appealed,
claiming the trial court erred in failing to provide his requested lesser-included-offense
instruction for felony-murder, "which would have permitted the jury to find him guilty of
an unintentional killing that occurred in the commission of robbery, aggravated robbery,
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burglary, or aggravated burglary." id.
In reversing the case, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
As a factual matter, there is no question that Stewart was tied up at the time the fire
was set and that his death was caused by the fire, nor is there any real question that
either Hansen or Rocco deliberately set the fire. Realistically speaking, then,
under the facts presented to the jury, whoever was found responsible for setting the
fire almost certainly would have to be found to have at least "knowingly" killed
Stewart and, therefore, be convicted of an intentional killing committed during the
course of a felony. Conversely, one found not responsible for the fire would have
to be acquitted of all charges. The jury was never given the choice of finding that
Hansen was not responsible for the fire, yet was still guilty of a felony during
which an unintentional killing occurred. Its only choice was to find that he was
responsible for the fire that caused the death or to acquit him altogether. This is
exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included offense instructions are
designed to avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not have had to make
if Hansen's burglary or robbery-based felony-murder instruction had been given.
Therefore, we cannot find that the refusal to give the instruction was harmless. We
must reverse and remand for a new trial.
Hansen. 734 P.2d at 428.
As in Hansen, the evidence in Rosillo's case is susceptible of alternative
interpretations, one of which supports an acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge for
Rosillo and a conviction for robbery. Rosillo took money and a wallet from Lund when
Lund handed the property over.
However, Rosillo was not involved in using or threatening Lund with a weapon.
He did not directly use the weapon, and he did not solicit such use, request it, command
it, encourage it, or intentionally aid in the use of the weapon. See Utah Code Ann. § 762-202; Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123 (under accomplice liability statute for attempted
homicide, where a party did not actually engage in the shooting, the state was required to
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show that the party both had the required mental state for the charged offense, and
directly committed the shooting, or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided in committing the shooting); (R. 105 (jury instructed on party
liability)). The jury was required to resolve conflicts in the evidence concerning Rosillo's
level of participation.
In resolving those conflicts, the jury was never given the choice of finding that
Rosillo was not an accomplice to the aggravated robbery, and thus not criminally
responsible for use of the weapon, yet was still guilty as a result of his participation in the
matter. The jury was given only the choice to convict Rosillo of first-degree aggravated
robbery or to acquit. "This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included offense
instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not have had
to make" if the trial judge had provided the requested lesser-included offense instruction.
See Hansen. 734 P.2d at 428.
Rosillo has met the second part of the Baker analysis. He was entitled to an
instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery, and to a verdict form for the jury on
that lesser offense in order that the jury could deliberate the evidence in light of the
reasonable alternative inferences and informed choices.
C. THE ERROR HERE WAS PREJUDICIAL.
In State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although
defendant was able to satisfy both prongs of the Baker analysis, the trial court's failure to
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present the lesser-included offense instruction to the jury did not warrant reversal of the
matter because the error was "harmless." Id. at ^|20.
We agree with defendant that the Baker requirements were satisfied and that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of
attempted manslaughter. However, we hold that this error was harmless. As we
have previously explained, harmless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome
of the proceedings. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997). Put
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict. Id.
Evans, 2001 UT 22, |20.
The prejudice analysis seems to consider whether the state's evidence supporting
the greater offense was so overwhelming that it would be asking too much of the jury to
consider defendant's theory in the context of the requested lesser-included-offense
instruction. See Id. at ^23. Stated another way, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected
defendant's lesser-included-offense instruction when the defendant has presented
relatively minor evidence for the lesser offense compared to the state's overwhelming
evidence supporting the charged offense.
The following cases illustrate application of the harmless-error doctrine in the
context of a defendant's request for a lesser-included-offense instruction.
In Evans, the evidence presented at trial consisted of the following: On August 15,
1997, three undercover officers in street clothes initiated a traffic stop of defendant's
Monte Carlo when they observed, among other things, defendant and the passengers
passing around a bottle of alcohol. Evans. 2001 UT 22, lfl|2-3. While the officers were in
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two separate, unmarked cars, each officer testified that their cars were equipped with
sirens and various emergency lights in the grill and taillights, the windshield visor area,
and side markers. Also, the officers testified that to initiate the stop of defendant's car,
the officers engaged their emergency equipment. Id. atffl)2-3, 10.
After the officers had completed the stop, Officer Idle got out of his car and began
to approach Evans' car. When Officer Idle "had taken about three steps, the driver's side
door of the Monte Carlo opened, and defendant emerged holding a rifle. Defendant
immediately began firing at Officer Idle." Id. at ^[4.
According to the evidence, defendant discharged several bullets, hitting Office Idle
seven times. See id. at ^|5. Defendant then got back into his car and led officers on a
chase. When he was finally arrested, the state charged Evans with three counts of firstdegree-felony attempted aggravated murder for firing at law enforcement officers, and
one count of failing to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third-degree felony
offense. Id. at^{8.
At trial, defendant requested lesser-included offense instructions on attempted
manslaughter. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, defendant argued the trial
court erred in failing to provide the instructions where defendant had presented evidence
to support an "imperfect legal justification" under the attempted manslaughter provisions.
Id. at ^jl9. Defendant testified that he did not know he was shooting at officers because
he did not see their emergency equipment during the traffic stop. Defendant claimed that
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he began to fire because he saw a stranger in street clothes (Officer Idle) walking toward
him with a gun. See id. at ^|19.
In considering the matter on appeal, the supreme court ruled that while defendant
satisfied both prongs of the Baker analysis, the trial court's error in failing to provide the
lesser-included offense instruction was harmless. "In this case, the State offered
testimony from several witnesses that contradicted defendant's sole testimony that he did
not realize he had been pulled over by or had shot a police officer." Id. at ^21.
Passengers from defendant's car testified that defendant exclaimed prior to the traffic
stop that they were being pulled over. In addition, the passengers knew they were being
pulled over by police. The three officers and passers-by also testified that the officers had
emergency equipment engaged during the stop. Id. at ^21.
Several witnesses testified that the emergency lights were clearly visible on the
officers' cars during the traffic stop. "Only the testimony of defendant, that he was
unaware that the driver of the car pursuing him was an officer, stands counter to this
evidence. He offers no explanation as to how he saw Officer Idle, gun in hand, standing
in front of the police car with its red and blue flashing lights, but failed to see the lights
when looking carefully enough to see the gun in the officer's hand." Id at f22.
According to the court, "[defendant asks much of the jury." "[W]e conclude that it was
harmless error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense
of attempted manslaughter." Id. at ^[23.
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In Kruger, defendant was charged and convicted of felony murder. He appealed
and argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter where the evidence supported that he committed
the offense recklessly or under an extreme emotional disturbance. Kruger, 2000 UT 60,
If 1. The supreme court ruled that defendant failed to present a sufficient quantum of
evidence to justify an acquittal on the greater offense of felony murder and a conviction
on the lesser offense of manslaughter. Id. at 11^15-17.
Specifically, four witnesses testified that Kruger admitted to shooting the victim
during the course of a robbery. Id. at 1J19. One witness testified that Kruger had a habit
generally of exaggerating. Id. Under those circumstances, the court ruled that ff[g]iven
the totality of the evidence and facts of this case, no reasonable jury could disregard the
testimony of four witnesses to whom Kruger confessed that he attempted to rob Garcia,
just because Anne testified that Kruger often fantasized and exaggerated generally.
Thus, there is not a rational basis in the evidence to acquit Kruger of felony murder." Id
In Baker, the defendant argued he was entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction for criminal trespass. Baker. 671 P.2d at 154. According to the facts,
defendant was found in a storage closet of a locked building; he did not deny breaking
into the gas station or forcibly opening a locked desk. Defendant was charged with
burglary. On appeal, he argued he was too intoxicated to form intent and the jury should
have been instructed on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. Id at 159.
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The supreme court found that the only evidence from the defense in support of the
intoxication theory was the testimony of defendant's friend. The friend testified ,fthat the
defendant was stopped by police while driving the friend home, that the police asked the
defendant to get out of the truck, that they talked with him and smelled his breath but did
not give him the field sobriety test, allowing him instead to get back into his truck and
drive away." id. According to the court,
the only evidence of intoxication showed that the defendant was not seriously
enough incapacitated by his drinking to cause the police to give him field sobriety
tests. This is not a sufficient quantum of evidence to warrant an instruction
regarding the defendant's capacity to form an intent. Even if it were, the
defendant's theory would not support the giving of an instruction on criminal
trespass, an offense which itself requires a specific intent. The thrust of the
defendant's evidence on intoxication was to negate any specific intent at all, not to
prove the existence of one of the intents necessary for criminal trespass. See State
v. Hendricks, supra, at 634.
Baker, 671 P.2d at 160.
In this matter, the victim Steven Lund testified that he observed two men standing
next to each other, Mallory, who held a gun, and Rosillo. (R. 144:15-16.) According to
Lund, Rosillo twice ordered him to hand over his property. (R. 144:17-18.) Lund handed
his money then wallet to Rosillo, who placed the items in his pocket. (R. 144:17-19.)
Lund also testified that initially he was confused about the matter and could not recall
what the suspects said (R. 144:32-33; 144:35), he initially recalled that the suspects
demanded money from him only once (R. 144:35-36), and he initially was confused as to
whether the suspect who wore the bright blue sweatshirt demanded the money (Mallory)
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or whether it was the other suspect. (R. 144:38.) Lund also thought Mallory and Rosillo
looked alike. (R. 144:40.)
Both Rosillo and Lund testified that at all times Mallory had control and exclusive
possession of the gun. In addition, Lund did not observe the men as they approached him
from behind. Thus, Lund's testimony did not contradict evidence that Mallory initiated
the robbery on his own and pulled the gun out at the last minute, while Rosillo became
involved only to keep things calm.
Rosillo testified that he took the money and wallet from Lund because he felt he
did not have a choice. (R. 145:15.) He was afraid that Mallory might shoot somebody if
Rosillo did not accept the money from Lund, and Rosillo wanted to keep things calm. (R.
145:15; 145:19; 145:31.)
The lesser-included-offense instruction for robbery in this case does not ask too
much of the jury. It is not like Evans or Kruger where the defendant's testimony in those
cases was in conflict with an overwhelming amount of evidence from numerous other
witnesses. Rather, in this case, the trial came down to a credibility judgment; in relevant
respects the evidence came down to the word of the key prosecution witness against the
word of the defendant, where Lund testified that Rosillo demanded money and the wallet,
and Rosillo testified that Lund was mistaken in identifying him as making the demands.
In other respects, Rosillo's testimony regarding the matter was uncontested or was
consistent with Lund's, where Rosillo testified that Mallory had the gun, Mallory initiated
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the robbery, Rosillo participated out of fear and to keep the situation calm, and Rosillo
was not aware the Mallory had a gun until Lund turned around and Mallory demanded the
money. In this case, given the evidence, the jury should have been allowed to consider
the matter in light of the appropriate instructions and choices, including the instruction for
the lesser-included offense of robbery.
In addition, this case is not like Baker where the defendant there was trading one
criminal intent for another. Indeed, it is distinguishable from Baker. In the context of
this case, where the state presented an accomplice liability theory, the law recognizes that
parties to an offense may have criminal intent to commit different offenses. That is,
while one party may intend to assault the victim, another party may intend to kill the
victim. Each party may be found responsible for the other's conduct, but only to the
degree of his own mental state. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461-62 (while evidence supported
criminal intent, some parties may have intended assault while others intended death);
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428 (while evidence supported different theories of aggravated
murder and felony murder, under the accomplice liability theory defendant was entitled to
have his theory presented to the jury: that he intended to commit burglary and robbery,
but did not intend death, thereby supporting felony murder); Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123
(under accomplice liability statute where a party did not actually engage in the shooting,
the state was required to show that the party both had the required mental state for the
charged offense, and he directly committed the shooting, or solicited, requested,
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commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in committing the shooting).
In this case, Rosillo maintained that he did not commit the aggravated robbery.
Thus, the only question was the degree of his liability. The jury here deliberated the
evidence for hours, likely struggling to make some sense of the limited choices they were
provided. (R. 145:85; 146 (jury began deliberations at 1:20 p.m. on November 29, and
came to a verdict on November 30); R. 105; 103; 108 (jury instructed on accomplice
liability and that it could not consider Mallory's conduct in deliberating case against
Rosillo; jury also instructed to either acquit or to find Rosillo guilty of aggravated robbery
for use of a dangerous weapon).)
In other contexts, where the standard of review does not require the court to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense, see Kruger. 2000 UT 60,
T[14 (in considering defendant's requested lesser-included-offense instruction, court must
"view the evidence and the inferences that can be draw from it in the light most favorable
to the defense"), Utah appellate courts have refused to find "harmless" error where the
jury was required to resolve conflicts in the issues, particularly as they related to the
defendant's credibility. State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Trov. 688 P.2d 483,486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400,403 (Utah
1986) (when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, court
is less likely to find harmless error). Since the evidence in this case on the critical,
aggravated element was in conflict and required the jury to resolve issues concerning
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accomplice liability and defendant's credibility, the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the defense supported providing the jury with the instruction on the lesserincluded offense of robbery. This Court should find that the refusal to give the
instruction was prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Rosillo respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing this case for a new trial
where Rosillo may present an instruction to the jury on the lesser offense of robbery.
SUBMITTED this&^day of
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LINDA M. JONES (J
LISA J. REMAL
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

33

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that 1 have caused to be hand delivered an
original and H

copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State,

5th Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and V copies to the Attorney
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box
140854, thisjflfci

day of

<:

Q^JL7f

/)

-200L

LINDA M.JONES

^

/L/

DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of
Appeals Court as indicated above this

day of

34

, 2001.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
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Case No:

001914670
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Clerk:
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Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : REMAL, LISA J,
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 21, 1977
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/30/2000 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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ADDENDUM B

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

76-6-301. RobberyCD A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery*
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

vs.

CRIMINAL NO. 001914670

JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO,
Defendant

.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO is
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the
commission of

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY . The Information alleges:

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 3 00 South 3 00
East, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 18,
2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JESUS ISREAL
ROSILLO, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took
personal property in the possession of Steve Lund from the person
or immediate presence of Steve Lund, and in the course of
committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous
weapon, to wit: a gun.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2

Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered

by you as a

statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded
by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations of the
Information. The mere fact that the defendant stands charged with
an offense is not to be taken by you as any evidence of his guilt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3

You are instructed that to the Information the defendant has
entered a plea of not guilty.

The plea of not guilty denies each

and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained in the
Inf ormation and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and
all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and
beyond a reasonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

4

You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has
been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to the
charge by a committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his guilt
and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by you in
determining his guilt or innocence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*?

It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law
applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow
the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are
presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this court
and the defendant's plea of Mnot guilty.11

This duty you should

perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion or
prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be biased
against the defendant because of the fact that he has been arrested
for this offense, or because an Information has been filed against
him, or because he has been brought before the court to stand
trial.

None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you are

not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them that
he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you
to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.

Both the State of

Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand
and expect that you will conscientiously

and

dispassionately

consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that
you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences
of such verdict may be.
opinion of each juror.

The verdict must express the individual

INSTRUCTION NO.

L&

At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon
to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be
admitted.

You are not to be concerned with the reasons for such

rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them.

Whether

offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of law.
admitting

evidence

to which an objection

In

is made, I do not

determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor do I pass
on the credibility of the witness.

You are not to consider

evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out.
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must
not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the
reason for the objection.

INSTRUCTION NO,

H

Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile
such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict
cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine
from the evidence what the facts are. There are no definite rules
governing how you shall determine the weight or convincing force of
any evidence, or how you shall determine what the facts in this
case are.

But you should carefully and conscientiously consider

and compare

all of the testimony, and all of the facts and

circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine
therefrom what the facts are.

You are not bound to believe all

that the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing in
view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence.

You may

believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer
number in accordance with your honest convictions.

The testimony

of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter is
naturally less convincing on other matters.

So if you believe a

witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in
this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such
witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it is entitled
to.

INSTRUCTION NO.

%

Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts
of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base
their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant,
provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence,
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must
carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as
circumstantial.

The law makes no distinction between the two

classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to
their effectiveness in defendants favor, but respects each for
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a
reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a personfs conduct at any time in question
consists of the testimony of every witness who perceived such
conduct and which describes or relates what was perceived.

All

other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation
to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, statement or
other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by
reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it
may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict.

INSTRUCTION MO.

In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment.

The court and

other governmental agencies are responsible for deciding those
issues. Accordingly, the subject of penalty or punishment must not
in any way affect your decision as to the innocence or guilt of the
defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You

should

not

consider

as

\b

evidence

any

statement

of

counsel made during t h e t r i a l , unless such statement was made as
a s t i p u l a t i o n conceding the e x i s t e n c e of a fact or f a c t s .

INSTRUCTION NO.

\V

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a case of a reasonable

doubt as to whether his guilt has been satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
The burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Statefs evidence must obviate all

reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainty.

By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is

based upon reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and

women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or lack
of evidence in this case.

A reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt

that is merely fanciful or imaginary or is based on a wholly
speculative possibility.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable
doubt.

A determination that a criminal defendant has committed a

crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason,
impartiality, and common sense.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are the

exclusive

\~2-

judges of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of
the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result of
the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly,
if any is shown.

You may consider the witnesses' deportment upon

the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their
apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity
to know, their
remember.

ability to understand, and their capacity to

You should consider these matters together with all of

the other facts and circumstances which you may believe have a
bearing

on

statement.

the

truthfulness

or

accuracy

of

the witnesses1

INSTRUCTION NO.

V3

You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness
in his own behalf and his testimony should be received and given
the same consideration as you give to that of any other witness.
The fact that he stands accused of a crime is no evidence of his
guilt and is no reason for rejecting his testimony.

However, you

should weigh his testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of
any other witness.

INSTRUCTION NO.

VA

One may attempt to impeach a witness by showing that on some
former occasion the witness made a statement or statements that
were contradictory of the witness' testimony here.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\<5

Although there is more than one person
action,

the

case against

each person

independent of the case of the other.
person is on trial.

is

involved

separate

in this
from

and

In this case only one

You are not to concern yourselves with the

status of any other person involved in this action.

INSTRUCTION NO.

1 (j?

Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished

by means

of

force

or fear.

A person

commits

aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, that
person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon, either directly
or as a party to the crime.

INSTRUCTION NO.

|rl

Every person, a c t i n g with the mental s t a t e required for the
commission of t h e offense who d i r e c t l y commits the offense, who
solicits,

requests,

commands, encourages, or i n t e n t i o n a l l y

aids

another person t o engage in conduct which c o n s t i t u t e s an offense
s h a l l be c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e as a party for such conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO.

V%

The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting.

Intent, being a state

of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred
statements and circumstances.

from acts,

conduct,

INSTRUCTION NO.

\°\

Intent and motive should never be confused.
prompts a person to act, or fail to act.

Motive is what

Intent refers only to

the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted.
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not
be

proven.

The motive of an accused

is

immaterial

except

insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of
state of mind or intent.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^^

Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus Isreal Rosillo, of
the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the Information,
you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 18th day of August, 2 000, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Jesus Isreal Rosillo,
took personal property then in the possession of Steve Lund, from
the person or immediate presence of Steve Lund; and
2.

That such taking was unlawful; and

3.

That such taking was intentional; and

4.

That such taking was against the will of Steve Lund; and

5.

That such taking was accomplished by means of force or

fear; and
6.

That

in the course

of committing

such

taking, the

defendant was aware a dangerous weapon was used.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the
Information.

If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements,
then you must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

-D\

"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized
by law, or, without legal justification, or, illegal.
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
"Personal property" means anything of value, and includes
money.
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury.

INSTRUCTION NO.

-3^

In determining any fact in this case you should not consider
nor be influenced by any statement made or act done by me which you
may interpret as indicating my views thereon. You are the sole and
final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you
must determine such questions for yourselves from the evidence,
without regard to what you believe my opinions may be.

I have not

intended to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any
opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or
what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what my
views may be.

You must follow your own views.

INSTRUCTION NO,

03>

The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the
individual opinion of each juror.

It is the duty of each of you

after considering all the evidence in the case, to determine, if
possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant.
When you have reached a conclusion in that respect, you should not
change it merely because one or more or all of your fellow jurors
may have come to a different conclusion.
should

However, each juror

freely and fairly discuss with his fellow

evidence and the deduction to be drawn therefrom.

jurors the

If, after doing

so, any juror should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached
by him was wrong, he unhesitatingly should abandon that original
opinion and render his verdict according to his final decision.

INSTRUCTION MO.

2 ^

If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none
must be inferred by you.

For that reason, you are not to single

out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction,
and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions
as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others.
The order

in which

the

instructions

significance as to their relative importance.

are

given

has

no

INSTRUCTION MO.

The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying
all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just
and

lawful

verdict.

The

applicability

of

some

of

these

instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach as to what
the facts are.

As to any such instruction, the fact that it has

been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court
and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts
are. If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you
find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction.

INSTRUCTION NO. <^l*

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.

It is

rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury room,
to make an emphatic expression of an opinion on the case or to
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one
does that at the outset, a sense of pride may be aroused, and one
may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this
matter, but are judges.

The final test of the quality of your

service will lie in the verdict which you return to the court, not
in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire.

Have in mind

that you will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial
administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that
end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in the
jury room there can be no triumph except the ascertainment and
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice.

INSTRUCTION NO, ^T)

When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will
preside over your deliberations.
Your verdict in this case must be either:
Guilty of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, as
charged in the Information;
or
Not Guilty;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.
writing, and when

found,

must

Your verdict must be in

be signed

and dated

foreperson and then returned by you to this/court.

by your
When your

verdict has been found, notify the bailiff/that you are ready to
report to the court.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah.

rUDGE

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus Israel Rosillo, of the offense of Robbery, a
lesser included offense, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt
each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1. That on or about the 18th day of August, 2000, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
defendant, Jesus Israel Rosillo, took personal property then in the possession of Steve Lund,
from the person or immediate presence of Steve Lund; and
2..That such taking was unlawful; and
3. That such taking was intentional; and
4. That such taking was against the will of Steve Lund; and
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced that
the state has proven each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should find the defendant guilty of Robbery, a lesser included offense. If, on the other
hand, you are not convinced that the state has proven each and every one of the foregoing
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.
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